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THE LAW GIVETH AND 
THE LAW TAKETH AWAY: 
MARRIAGES OUT OF 
COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY 
EXCLUDING ACCRUAL 
POST 1984/88 
1 
1. THE TWO PRINCIPAL FORMS OF MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY SYSTEMS 
PRIOR TO 1984/88 
Prior to the commencement of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 for Whites, 
Coloureds and Indians, and prior to the commencement of the Marriage and Matrimonial 
Property Law Amendment Act 3 of 1988 for Blacks, there were primarily two ways in 
which one could get married: in community of property, with the husband having marital 
power; or out of community of property, excluding community of profit and loss and 
excluding the husband's marital power. 1 For Whites, Coloureds and Indians the first 
marital property system occurred automatically - in other words, unless the parties 
entered into an antenuptial contract specifically excluding community of profit and loss 
and the husband's marital power; the second, where the parties invoked the system by 
entering into an antenuptial contract to the same effect. The reverse applied for Blacks. 
1.1 THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF A MARRIAGE IN COMMUNITY 
OF PROPERTY 
Each system had its advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of a marriage in 
community of property is that it embodies the marital vows "for better for worse, for 
richer for poorer, in sickness and in health, to love and to cherish until parted by death" 
in that the parties share both their good fortunes and their bad ones. Thus the nurse 
wife who (not on account of her lack of industry) earns significantly less than her doctor 
husband, at the end of the day shares the spoils with him equally. That she also shares 
the burden of his misfortunes is arguably a disadvantage. Another debatable 
disadvantage is that they are jointly responsible for the running of the joint estate and 
hence the burdening or enhancing of it. Thus they are both required to agree to liability 
1 One could also marry out of community of property, but with community of profit and loss, 
although few did. See Visser P J and Potgieter J M Introduction to Family Law 2 ed Juta 
1998 p86. 
2 
for the mortgage bond, which encumbers the family home.2 This is only an arguable 
disadvantage, since it offers a large measure of protection to the wife, in as much as it 
prevents her husband from selling the matrimonial home from under her (as well as, 
although less usually, vice versa). 3 
1.2 THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF A MARRIAGE OUT OF 
COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY 
An advantage of a marriage out of community of property is that while the parties do not 
bloom together in times of plenty, neither do they both wilt in times of drought. While 
this flies in the face of the parties' marriage vows, it does theoretically mean that the 
errant husband does not erode the prudent wife's assets. Or when the hard-working 
husband's sole proprietorship fails, the family home - which is in his wife's name - is 
spared from attachment by angry creditors. Another advantage is that each party 
administers their own separate estate. They therefore do not require the consent of the 
other to acquire or encumber their own assets. However, the disadvantages of this 
form of marriage, in practice, far outweigh the advantages. 4 
Let us envisage the plight of a woman marrying out of community of property pre-1984, 
for example in 1978. Our nurse wife, aged 24, accompanied her prospective husband, 
a doctor, to his attorney in order that he may draw up their antenuptial contract. While it 
was the attorney's professional duty to explain the matrimonial property options to the 
parties, he may not have done so adequately. This may have been a mere oversight on 
his part, or, on account of him being the prospective husband's attorney, an omission 
2 See also Visser and Potgieter Introduction to Family Law op cit p87-88. 
3 Section 15(2) of the Matrimonial Property Act provides that neither spouse shall alienate, 
mortgage or otherwise burden the property without the written consent of the other. Sinclair J 
assisted by Heaton J The Law of Marriage Vol. 1 Juta 1996 p479. 
4 See also Visser and Potgieter Introduction to Family Law op cit p88. 
3 
informed by a desire to fulfil his client's wishes. However, even if the prospective 
husband's attorney had explained to the prospective wife what the matrimonial property 
options were, and she had elected that option which was to afford her the greatest 
financial security - namely, a marriage in community of property - her prospective 
husband would simply have refused to marry her in the circumstances. It would have 
been a case of "marry me on my terms or not at all". The societal stigma of being a 
spinster - or, worse, the mother of illegitimate offspring - was sufficient to drive her into 
a marriage on his terms. Besides, like most women, she had been primed not to work, 
but to be a wife, mother and homemaker. Hence she had been discouraged from 
pursuing tertiary studies and a career of her own. When she did obtain tertiary 
education, she was drawn to a career that was traditionally female-dominated, hence 
devalued by society and thus poorly paid.5 Furthermore, it was the very men who did 
not wish to share the spoils of their marriage with their erstwhile wives, and who desired 
absolute control over their own estates, who elected to be married in this way. 6 These 
same patriarchal men who not wish their wives to work assure them that they, as the 
breadwinners, will provide, and that they "need not worry their pretty little heads about 
such things as money". 7 The antenuptial contract, as its name implies, was in any event 
entered into prior to the marriage. Prior to the marriage the prospective wife had stars 
5 In respect of the value society attaches to traditionally "women's work", and the disparity 
between men and women's earnings see: United States Women's Bureau The Earnings Gap 
Between Women and Men Washington The Bureau 1979; Kemp A A Women's Work Degraded 
and Devalued Engelwood Cliffs N J Prentice Hall 1994; Waring M Counting for Nothing: What 
Men Value and What Women are Worth Sydney Allen and Uwin 1990. 
6 Sinclair notes that " ... the accrual system is frequently excluded in the antenuptial contract in 
situations which reflect the choice of the party whose estate is most likely to increase (the 
husband), rather than the informed choice of both parties" Sinclair assisted by Heaton, The Law 
of Marriage op cit p143. 
7 Sinclair notes that young women still rely heavily on the dangerous notion that they will marry, 
have children and be supported throughout their lives by their husbands. Sinclair J Family Rights 
in Rights and Constitutionalism: The New South African Legal Order Juta 1994 p548. 
4 
in her eyes. 8 Her prospective husband had promised to keep her and she wanted to 
trust him. She earnestly believed that this was a marriage "until we are parted by death 
and thereto I give my word .... Those whom God has joined together should not be 
separated by man". And if their marriage was until death, she had little to worry about. 
Regrettably, it seldom was. 
As a young couple starting out, there was less of a disparity in our nurse wife and her 
doctor husband's wealth than became apparent later. As the marriage progressed, the 
nurse wife - who, after three years of marriage, gave up nursing to look after the 
children9 - got poorer and poorer. While she kept house, her doctor husband became 
increasingly wealthy. With the advances in medicine, the longer she remained out of 
practice, the more she lost her skills and the less likely it was that she could re-enter the 
same profession. Her doctor husband, on the other hand, acquired additional 
qualifications and experience as his reputation spread and expertise soared. 10 
8 South Africa Law Commission Report on the Review of the Law of Divorce : Amendment of 
Section 7(3) of the Divorce Act 1979 Report July 1990 at p11. See 3.1.2.2 on p16. 
9 Koch R J "The Value of a Wife's Service in the Home" De Rebus March 1986 p105 notes that 
in Richter v Capital Assurance Co Ltd 1963 CB (Corbett and Buchanan) 1 101 (E) at 108, "a 
robust housewife of German stock had been prevented by her injuries from fulfilling her 
accustomed role. The court awarded as compensation the value of the cost of employing 
sufficient staff to replace her services: two servants, a labourer and a kwedien!" See fn 5. 
10 Even when parties like the nurse wife and doctor husband described above are married in 
community of property, in the event of divorce a fair division does not occur due to the law's 
failure to recognise that property comprises more than just the family home and its contents. As 
Weitzman notes: "The courts are not, in fact, dividing property equally. This is partially as a 
result of major changes in the nature of property that have occurred in our society. Husbands 
and wives are increasingly investing in careers and human capital - most particularly in the 
husband's education and career. The new property resulting from this kind of investment is often 
the family's major asset. Yet this property is not typically divided equally upon divorce. In fact, in 
many states, it is not divided at all. It is simply presumed to belong to the husband. But if the 
law allows men to retain their career assets - their professional licences, their health insurance 
and their earning capacities - then their wives are not, in fact, being awarded an equal share of 
the joint property, despite the equal division rule." Weitzman L J "Judicial Perceptions and 
Perceptions of Judges: The Divorce Law Revolution in Practice" p74-113 in Crites L L and 
Hepperle W L (eds) Women, the Courts and Equality Skye Publications 1987 p44-45. 
5 
The house he bought (but that she chose, cleaned, renovated and maintained) was 
registered in his name. So, too, were the car, the holiday cottage and the boat. More 
importantly, so were the shares, the savings, the retirement annuities and the goodwill 
attached to his practice. In the event of divorce, she stood to receive nothing. What 
was his was his; what was hers was hers. So when he went off with his vast estate, she 
took the contents of her wardrobe and the items on her dressing table. Foolishly, she 
did not put aside and invest the "pin money" she had earned working a few days a week 
as a chemist's counter assistant. She spent it on bread, milk, newspapers and paying 
the gardener who wanted his salary in cash. 11 
In addition to the clothes in her wardrobe and the cosmetics on her dressing table, our 
nurse wife left the marriage with those items her doctor husband bestowed upon her in 
the antenuptial contract. These usually consisted of the wedding gifts: the Corningware 
and Pyrex oven dishes that were cracked and broken long before the marriage started 
fragmenting. 
Thus, on divorce at the age of 46, our nurse wife is in an unenviable position. Having 
graduated with a BSc (Nursing) in 1975 and having stopped practising some three 
years later, and having for 22 years been her husband's companion, friend, lover, 
11 While our nurse wife could, in terms of Section 3 of the Matrimonial Affairs Act 37 of 1953, 
recover from her husband all the money she had spent on household necessities, given her 
earnings relative to her husband's, she earned so little that the extent of her claim was negligible 
compared with the assets he had accumulated. In any event, she did not keep proof of her 
expenditure, never imagining as she incurred it that at some time in the future she may wish she 
had. Sinclair J An Introduction to the Matrimonial Property Act 1984 Juta 1984 p41-46. For 
further reading regarding the earning disparity between men and women both during marriage 
and after divorce as well as the sharing or lack of sharing of family responsibilities during 
marriage see : Arendell T Mothers and Divorce: Legal, Economic and Social Dilemmas Berkeley 
University of California Press 1986; Braver S L "The Gender Gap in Standard of Living after 
Divorce: Vanishing Small?" Family Law Quarterly Vol 33 No 1 Spring 1999 p111-34; Gilbert L A 
Two Careers, One Family: The Promise of Gender Equality Newbury Park California Sage 1993; 
Meintjies-Van der Walt L "Levelling the Playing Fields" ILJ Vol 19 No 1 1998 p22-34; South 
African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union and South African Committee for Higher 
Education Sharing the Load: The Struggle for Gender Equality, Parental Rights and Childcare 
Johannesburg Learn and Teach Publications in association with SACCAWU and LA COM 1991. 
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housemaid, child-minder, driver, nurse, teacher, cook, telephonist, estate manager, 
gardener, buyer, office administrator, entertainer, function co-ordinator, bookkeeper, 
locum receptionist in his practice and laundry maid, she is left with nothing but her 
children. At the time of their divorce there are four children aged 21, 19, 17 and 14. All 
but the eldest are dependants. Her prospects of re-employment as a nurse are virtually 
nil. Medicine has changed dramatically since she qualified some 25 years ago. If she 
were to re-qualify, she would be 51 after doing so: too old to embark on what would be 
a new career, and unaccustomed to the arduous work nursing entails, such as turning 
bedridden patients every few hours to prevent them from getting bedsores. Besides, 
her youngest child cannot practicably be left in the care of his older siblings for the 
duration of the nightshift from 18h00-06h00. She could acquire fresh skills, but she is 
intimidated by new technology. Also, she has always been made to feel intellectually 
inferior to her husband and over the years this has eroded her self-esteem. Rusty with 
inexperience, she is an undesirable employee. Employers prefer a younger woman, 
attractive enough to bolster their image, abreast of the most recent technological 
advances, without children and hence requiring no time off to collect a child from school 
who missed the bus or take to the doctor to have stitches after injuring himself on the 
rugby field. In fact, the childcare responsibilities, which she has always borne single-
handedly, make it impossible for her to consider anything but a mornings-only job of the 
most menial kind, with a suitably menial salary. 12 She can remarry, but her prospects 
are remote. Besides, even if she did, the chances of her second marriage ending in 
12 Sinclair notes : "Within what is known as 'the public sphere', women universally suffer 
disadvantage in employment. Preferences for hiring males, the concentration of women in lower-
paid jobs and in part-time work, the wage differential between men and women, the higher risk of 
dismissal and lower chance of promotion, the intractable question of maternity leave: These are 
some of the crucial issues to be found. Thus the workplace, structured as it is with a bias in 
favour of the ideal worker - the male with no child-care responsibilities - must be one focus. The 
oppression of women in the workplace cannot be resolved without confronting the role of women 
in the home. Their lone domestic responsibility, and the characterization of (unpaid) domestic 
work as women's work are features of the patriarchal structure of our society and of the system of 
paid labour that inhibit the achievement by women of their full potential". Sinclair assisted by 
Heaton The Law of Marriage op cit p69. 
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divorce are higher than her first one. So our nurse wife leaves her first marriage without 
skills, without assets or income, without savings, with three dependent children and the 
responsibility that goes with them. She is the new poor and, until her children are self-
sufficient, they accompany her into the ghetto. 13 
2. THE LEGISLATURE'S ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE THE LOT OF MAINLY 
WOMEN, MARRIED OUT OF COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY 
2.1 THE INTRODUCTION OF A JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO REDISTRIBUTE 
ASSETS IN MARRIAGES OUT OF COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY PRE-1984/88 
In a bid to alleviate the plight of women such as our nurse wife, in 1984 section 36(b) of 
the Matrimonial Property Act inserted section 7(3) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979, which 
granted the court a discretion to redistribute the matrimonial property along equitable 
lines. 14 
13 Rhode D L Justice and Gender Sex Discrimination and the Law Harvard University Press 1989 
p149 notes that according to current projections, about half of all contemporary marriages will 
end in divorce, and 60% of all children will spend time in single-parent homes. By the late 1980s 
half of all single-parent families lived in poverty, and divorced or separated women headed 70% 
of those families. See fn 12 and 99. 
14 Sinclair contends that the discretion should apply to all marriages, regardless of the proprietary 
system. She contends that undue harshness can flow from unalterable equal sharing in a 
marriage in community of property, just as it can flow from a complete separation of property. 
She cites various examples: 
1. In a marriage of very short duration in which one spouse suddenly amasses a fortune 
by virtue of work done, such as the writing of a novel, over an extended period prior to the 
marriage; 
2. where the accrual system has been modified to exclude the major profit-bearing 
asset; or 
3. where the accrual system has not been modified to reflect the changing value of 
money and inflation has reduced the profit to zero. 
In all these cases Sinclair contends there should be a residual judicial power to prevent an 
injustice occurring. Sinclair An Introduction to the Matrimonial Property Act op cit p52 and Sinclair 
J "Financial Provision on Divorce - Need Compensation or Entitlement?" 98 SALJ 1981 p469. 
For further reading in respect of the judicial discretion see : Bronstein V "Divorce: Judicial 
Discretion" Annual Survey of South African Law 1992 pS-8 and p37-40; Clark B Van Heerden B 
"Asset Redistribution on Divorce: The Exercise of Judicial Discretion" SALJ Vol 106 No 2 May 
1989 p243-249; Garrison M "How do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of 
Discretionary Decision Making" North Carolina Law Review Vol 74 Jan 1996 p401-552; Golden L 
J Equitable Distribution of Property Colorado Springs, Colorado: Shepard's/McGraw-Hill 1983; 
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This remedy only applied to Whites, Indians and Coloureds. S7(3) of the Divorce Act at 
that stage provided: "A court granting a decree of divorce in respect of a marriage out of 
community of property entered into before the commencement of the Matrimonial 
Property Act in terms of an antenuptial contract by which community of property, 
community of profit and loss and accrual sharing in any form are excluded, may, subject 
to the provisions of subsections (4), (5) and (6), on application by one of the parties to 
that marriage, in the absence of any agreement between them regarding the division of 
their assets, order that such assets, or such part of the assets, of the other party as the 
court may deem just be transferred to the first-mentioned party." 
Then, in 1988, section 2 of the Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act, 
Act 3 of 1988, amended section 7(3) of the Divorce Act so as also to extend its 
application to marriages entered into by Blacks in terms of Section 22(6) of the Black 
Administration Act, Act 38 of 1927 .15 
Goodman E "Property Law Following Dissolution of Marriage: Is There a Future for Judicial 
Discretion?" Federal Law Review Vol 13 Sept 1982 p131-49; Jackson E et al "Financial Support 
on Divorce: the Right Mixture of Rules and Discretion?" International Journal of Law and the 
Family Vol 7 Aug 1993 p230-54; Jordaan R "Redistribution of Assets" Codicil/us Vol 29 No 1 May 
1988 p71-72; Keyser B "Judicial Discretion" Annual Survey of South African Law 1989 p20-26. 
15 As a result of this amendment, section 7(3) of the Divorce Act, 70 of 1979, now provides as 
follows: 
"A court granting a decree of divorce in respect of a marriage out of community of 
property-
(a) entered into before the commencement of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 
1984, in terms of an antenuptial contract by which community of property, 
community of profit and loss and accrual sharing in any form are excluded; and 
(b) entered into before the commencement of the Marriage and Matrimonial 
Property Law Amendment Act, 1988, in terms of Section 22(6) of the Black 
Administration Act 38 of 1927, as it existed immediately prior to its repeal by the 
said Marriage and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act 3 of 1988, 
may, subject to the provisions of subsections (4), (5) and (6), on application by one of the parties 
to that marriage, in the absence of any agreement between them regarding the division of their 
assets, order that such assets, or such part of the assets, of the other party as the court may 
deem just be transferred to the first-mentioned party". 
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2.2 THE INTRODUCTION OF A NEW FORM OF MARRIAGE: OUT OF 
COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY INCLUDING THE ACCRUAL SYSTEM 
The Matrimonial Property Act also introduced a new and third form of marriage which 
was designed to incorporate the good of both marriages in community and marriages 
out of community of property (namely, in the former, that the parties shared their good 
fortunes irrespective of their respective contributions, but in the case of the latter, that if 
one of the parties fell on hard times, this did not impact on the other). This was a 
marriage out of community of property and out of community of profit and loss but 
including the accrual system. This form of marriage, in the event of divorce, gave the 
spouse whose estate had shown the smaller growth or accrual the right to receive half 
of the difference between the growths in the estates of the two spouses. 16 This new 
system allowed the parties to retain their separate estates during the marriage but, on 
dissolution, share the profits of their union. 
Thus for those women married out of community of property pre-1984/88, the 
Matrimonial Property Act extended a remedy: the court was afforded a discretion to 
redistribute the matrimonial property along equitable lines irrespective of the fact that 
they had married out of community of property. And, for those women married post-
1984/88, another form of matrimonial property system was added: they could still marry 
in community of property if they chose to; they could marry out of community of property 
too - excluding any profit-sharing, just as before; or they could marry out of community 
of property including the accrual system, thereby retaining separate estates during the 
marriage, but sharing the profits on dissolution. 
16 See Visser and Potgieter Introduction to Family Law op cit p87. 
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3. LEAVING WOMEN MARRIED WITH AN EXPRESS EXCLUSION OF THE 
ACCRUAL SYSTEM OUT IN THE COLD 
The legislature made what is, in my view, a grave error: it recognised the plight of 
women married out of community of property prior to 1984/88 and granted the judicial 
discretion to them to remedy it. It gave those women marrying after 1984/88 a better 
range of choices than they had had previously. But it retained marriages out of 
community of property with an express exclusion of the accrual system and left those 
women remediless. Judicial discretion cannot be invoked to relieve the harshness of 
their situation. 17 Having made their bed, they must lie in it. And who is to say that the 
women marrying out of community of property pre-1984/88 were any worse off than 
those marrying out of community of property excluding the accrual system post-
1984/88? In my view, their position is no different: 
As Helen Suzman queried with incredulity at the time the Matrimonial Property Bill was 
being debated: 
"The question which arises is this: What about those wives who, after the 
promulgation of the Bill, get married out of community of property and without 
the accrual system, as they can contract to do by ANC excluding the accrual 
system? They will then be in the same position as wives who are [in] the 
position, which the Bill attempts to remedy. Actually they will be in a worse 
position because of clause 23, because they will not even have the protection 
previously given them in terms of section 3 of the Matrimonial Affairs Act of 
1953".18 
The Minister of Justice at the time explained the motivation behind this lacuna: 
"What is the philosophy of this Bill? Its philosophy is that we are introducing a 
system of matrimonial property in which the parties have a choice. As regards 
17 Section 7(3) of the Divorce Act applies only to those Whites, Coloureds and Indians married 
out of community of property prior to the commencement of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 
1984 and in terms of section 7(3)(b) to Blacks married before the commencement of the Marriage 
and Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act 3, 1988, in terms of section 22(6) of the Black 
Administration Act 38 of 1927, as it existed immediately prior to its repeal by the Marriage and 
Matrimonial Property Law Amendment Act. Hence it is of retrospective application only. See fn 
15. 
18 House of Assembly Debates 1984 (Hansard) 115 cols 8 481-11 624 11 June-12 July 
col 9 003. For a description of the provisions of section 3 of the Matrimonial Affairs Act of 1953, 
see p30. 
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existing marriages, we are g1v1ng people an opportunity of having the new 
matrimonial property system, including the accrual system, made applicable to 
their marriage within a period of two years. If they do not do so, the parties in an 
existing marriage can still apply jointly to the court to alter the system of 
matrimonial property and make the accrual system applicable to their marriage. 
However, we as legislators admit that there could be situations in existing 
marriages in which the wife cannot persuade the husband to alter the system of 
matrimonial property because there are financial considerations linked to that for 
him. That is why it is not being made part of our system of matrimonial property, 
but it is part of our divorce law that in the unnatural event of a divorce, the court 
may be of assistance to the married couples who do not have an accrual system. 
That is the philosophy. 
Why are we making a distinction between an existing marriage and a future 
marriage in this regard? That, too, is very logical. Our philosophy is that we do 
not wish to prescribe to the parties how they should arrange their domestic 
affairs, their affairs in respect of proprietary rights. That is why our approach is 
that future spouses ought to know what choices they have. They can make the 
accrual system applicable to their marriage from the outset if they wish. If we 
were to keep another backdoor open, we would be creating the uncertainty in 
this new system - . . . - that the court could still intervene in the future. What 
would the purpose of an accrual system be then? The wife could then say that 
she does not want the accrual system, but that she is going to take that risk. 
We want to normalise matters. That is why we do not want to give future 
marriages this loophole. People who marry in the future must know what they 
are letting themselves in for. We are not going to assist them or interfere in their 
domestic affairs. They must decide for themselves whether or not they are 
going to make the accrual system applicable. If they change their minds later, 
they must decide to do so jointly. Another very important characteristic of this 
system is that it is flexible. The parties must concur, however, and the court 
cannot interfere. That is why we want to phase out the so-called just discretion 
of the court."19 
Regrettably, the Minister of Justice and his advisors vastly underestimated the social 
reality for women that seldom allow them truly, freely to "decide for themselves". 
3.1 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST EXTENDING THE JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
TO MARRIAGES OUT OF COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY WITH AN EXPRESS 
EXCLUSION OF THE ACCRUAL SYSTEM 
In 1990 the South African Law Commission was asked to consider whether section 7(3) 
of the Divorce Act should be amended to extend to marriages out of community of 
property with an express exclusion of the accrual system after 1984/88, along with other 
19 House of Assembly Debates op cit, cols 9 005-9 006. 
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amendments. 20 They considered arguments both for and against the extension. These 
can be summarized as follows: 
3.1.1 ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE EXTENSION 
3.1.1.1 It does not respect parties' freedom to contract 
The legislature wanted to retain parties' freedom to contract. One contributor 
referred to the universal recognition of the principles of contractual freedom and 
freedom of choice as set out in the English judgment: Printing and Numerical 
Registration Co v Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq 462 at p465: 
"It must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily those rules 
which say that a given contract is void as being against public policy, 
because if there is one thing which more than another public policy 
requires, it is that men of full age and competent understanding shall 
have the utmost liberty of contracting and that their contracts when 
entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be 
enforced by courts of justice. Therefore, you have this paramount public 
policy to consider that you are not likely to interfere with this freedom of 
contract. "21 
3.1.1.2 Normal contractual remedies apply to antenuptial contracts entered into 
under coercion justus error or fraud 
If the contract was not entered "freely and voluntarily" and there was coercion, 
justus error or fraud, the normal contractual principles would apply to render the 
contract voidable. 22 
One contributor disputed that the purpose of a judicial discretion is to protect 
those who have contracted, for whatever reason, be it ignorance, coercion or 
20 Law Commission Report on the amendment of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act op cit. 
21 Law Commission Report on the amendment of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act op cit p130-14. 
22 Law Commission Report on the amendment of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act op cit p15. 
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even foolishness, to their disadvantage. He contended that, besides, there 
would be little chance of ignorance as the notary would have explained 
alternatives to the parties and, even if he had not, "it has never been the object 
of the law to protect the foolish". 23 
3.1.1.3 A marital property system excluding any sharing is chosen deliberately 
Another contributor contended that practical experience has shown that since 
the introduction of the Divorce Act, the only parties who opt for "cold exclusion" 
do so for clear and well-considered reasons and that such decisions should be 
respected. 24 
3.1.1.4 The judicial discretion applicable to marriages out of community of property 
pre-1984/88 is a temporary emergency measure only 
The legislature viewed allowing a judicial discretion to redistribute property 
equitably in marriages entered into pre-1984/88 as a "temporary emergency 
measure", applicable to those who, for whatever reason, did not opt for the 
conversion possibilities under Section 21 of the Divorce Act. 25 
3.1.1.SA far-reaching discretionary distribution power is against the current 
judicial trend 
It was argued that even the courts had started to interpret restrictively the 
existing judicial discretion to redistribute equitably. According to contributor 
Professor Sonnekus, in Kretschmerv Kretschmer 1981 1 SA 566 (W), Kritzinger 
23 Law Commission Report on the amendment of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act op cit p15. 
24 Law Commission Report on the amendment of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act op cit p14. 
25 Law Commission Report on the amendment of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act op cit p13. 
See p11. 
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v Kritzinger 1989 1 SA 67 (A) and Katz v Katz 1989 3 SA 1 (A), the courts did 
not automatically give the applicant the right to share in the other spouse's 
assets irrespective of whether a real contribution towards the maintenance or 
growth of the other spouse's assets could have been proved. 26 
3.1.1.6 Extending the judicial discretion to marriages out of community of property 
with an express exclusion of the accrual system would encourage litigation, 
push up costs and extend the time of litigation27 
3.1.1. 7 Extending the judicial discretion to marriages out of community of property 
with an express exclusion of the accrual system would encourage 
cohabitation 
One contributor feared that if parties were unable to keep their estates separate 
during marriage and after divorce, they would opt for cohabitation. 28 
3.1.1. 8 Judicial discretion is foreign to South African Family Law 
Contributor Professor A H van Wyk argued that the discretionary principle 
contained in s7(3) of the Divorce Act is completely alien to the South African law 
of matrimonial property. He compared the South African family law system -
which is based on a conceptual approach, with a clear internal structure and 
fixed rules - to the English system, which depends largely on judicial discretion 
to solve problems. According to him, the amalgamation of such divergent 
systems is virtually impossible.29 
26 Law Commission Report on the amendment of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act op cit p13. 
27 Law Commission Report on the amendment of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act op cit p16. 
28 Law Commission Report on the amendment of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act op cit p16. 
29 Law Commission Report on the amendment of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act op cit p16-17. 
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3.1.1. 9 Judicial discretion creates uncertainty 
Some contributors felt that a judicial discretion creates considerable legal 
uncertainty. 30 
3.1.1.1 O An extension of the judicial discretion to marriages out of community of 
property excluding accrual would ignore the interests of creditors 
The Clearing Bankers' Association of South Africa had this concern: 
"The proposed amendment ignores the interests of creditors when a 
spouse, who enjoys certain privileges with regard to his or her assets, 
divorces his or her spouse who has few or no assets. In such cases the 
assets of the first-mentioned party will be partially reallocated to the other 
party, which will result in the creditors having a reduced possibility of 
recourse. The lacuna in the proposals [to extend the judicial discretion to 
marriages out of community of property with an express exclusion of the 
accrual system] is the absence of protection for banks and creditors 
against the diminishing of the assets of the spouse or spouses, owing to 
the redistribution order that is made". 31 
3.1.2 ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THE EXTENSION 
3.1.2.1 We cannot allow women to contract into poverty for themselves and for 
their children 
Sinclair32 argues that it is indefensible to allow women to contract into poverty for 
themselves and their children. She says it cannot be legitimised on the basis of 
freedom of contract. Nor can one argue that a judicial discretion is legitimate 
when applied to marriages prior to 1984/88, but not after it. Women married out of 
community of property with an express exclusion of the accrual system will be in 
the exact same position as those s7(3)(c) of the Divorce Act was designed to 
assist. So why should they not be assisted too? In any event, our matrimonial law 
30 Law Commission Report on the amendment of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act op cit p17. 
31 Law Commission Report on the amendment of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act op cit p21. 
32 Law Commission Report on the amendment of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act op cit p4-5. 
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allows a judicial discretion in respect of ordering a forfeiture of benefits. Why, 
then, is a judicial discretion permissible in one respect but not in another? Dillion 
reminds us that the relief provided by "s7(3) is not designed to protect those who 
have made an 'informed choice' - it is to protect those who contracted, for 
whatever reason, be it their ignorance, coercion or even foolishness, to their 
disadvantage". 33 
3.1.2.2Women entering into an antenuptial contract with an express exclusion of 
the accrual system are seldom making "an informed choice" 
Practising attorney and notary, Mr KG Mustard, had this to say: 
"From practical experience as a Notary, I am of the view that half the time 
the parties are so starry-eyed at the prospect of getting married that they 
do not listen to a word that the Notary is saying when he explains the 
options."34 
3.1.2.3 There is a power imbalance between the parties 
Glendon notes: 
"There is no reason to think that increased use of marriage contracts 
would enable the economically weaker spouse to bargain for property 
division and future economic security in case the marriage terminates by 
divorce. On the contrary, European and American experience and 
common sense indicate that such contracts, if they did come into wider 
use here, would probably more often be used by the stronger party to 
contract out of or to restrict the property division and future maintenance 
to the limits permitted by law." 35 
33 Law Commission Report on the amendment of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act op cit p5. For 
the opposing view see 3.1.2 p12-13. 
34 Law Commission Report on the amendment of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act op cit p11. 
35 Glendon MA The New Family and the New Property Butterworths 1981 p66. 
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Our law recognises the imbalance between other contracting parties such as employer 
and employees and has legislated to protect the weaker party. Thus the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 sets out the minimum time for tea and lunch 
breaks, the maximum number of working hours, etcetera. While these basic conditions 
can be varied, they can be varied in the main only by a Bargaining Council or Collective 
Agreement36 . Furthermore, on termination of the contract of employment by the 
employer, arguably onerous conditions apply to protect the worker. 37 The individual 
worker who is driven by the desire to get or retain a job cannot be bullied into accepting 
anything less than what the legislature believes is acceptable. Why is freedom to 
contract restricted on account of the parties' power imbalance in labour law, but not in 
family law? Perhaps it is on account of the public/private dichotomy38 in terms of which 
what happens in the family has been kept behind closed doors, deliberately left 
unregulated by the men who do the regulating. The women, a diverse and fragmented 
group, have been unable - like the workers, who are mainly men - to take their cries of 
"Inequality!" into the streets to demand legislative change. 
36 Chapter 7 section 49 Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997. 
37 Chapter 8 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
38 Goldblatt describes the public/private dichotomy as follows: men inhabit the public realm 
whereas women remain hidden within the private sphere. Men dominate the state and its 
institutions and the very nature of the state has been infused with male power and the ideology of 
male superiority. As a result of women's location within the family, and as the subject of men's 
power within the family, they are not accorded full status as citizens in society. As the family is 
firmly located within the private sphere, it has provided the justification of the lack of state 
interference in the family where men control women and children, often with violence. Goldblatt 
B "A feminist perspective in the law reform process" SALJ Centre for Applied Legal Studies; 
p375. For further reading on the public/private distinction : Arniel B Politics and Feminism 
Oxford UK Malden Mass Blackwell 1999; Baker S Anneke van Doorne Huiskas (eds) Women 
and Public Policy : The Shifting Boundaries Between the Public and Private Sphere Aldershot 
Ashage 1999; Crotty P M Women and Family Law: Connecting the Public and the Private New 
York P Lang 1997. Gavison R "Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction" Stanford Law 
Review Vol 45 Nov 1992 p1-45; Oliver D The Public/Private Divide London Butterworths 1999; 
Olsen F "Constitutional Law Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction Constitutional 
Commentary Vol 1 O Summer 1993; Thornton M Public and Private Feminist Legal Debates 
Melbourne Vic Oxford University Press 1995. 
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The Commission was loath to vary the 1982 Law Commission's finding. It was of the 
view that the previous commission had considered the English system, which provides 
for an equitable redistribution on dissolution and, after much deliberation, had rather 
opted for the German approach, which was akin to our accrual system. The previous 
commission did not want to interfere with existing vested rights but, aware of the 
hardship of a total separation without the option of accrual, had recommended that the 
judicial discretion to redistribute assets apply to those parties who had not had the 
option of the accrual system only. The Commission felt that the judicial discretion to 
redistribute assets had only been granted as "an outlet valve" to operate retrospectively, 
not prospectively. To allow it to operate prospectively, it was felt, would be to introduce 
a new matrimonial property system into our law. The Commission succinctly cited the 
major disadvantages of a discretionary system as it saw them as being: 
"[l]egal uncertainty, infringement of contractual freedom and the possibility that 
the distribution of assets could be in conflict with the wishes of a party. A simple 
example is that of divorced people or widowers or widows who decide to enter 
into a second or third marriage at an advanced age. It is normally the wish of 
such parties to keep their estates absolutely separate for their respective families 
and, accordingly, the possibility of a court order with regard to the transfer of 
assets should be excluded."39 
The Commission therefore recommended that the discretionary division of assets not be 
extended to marriages out of community of property with an express exclusion of the 
accrual system. 
39 Law Commission Report on the amendment of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act op cit p23-4. 
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4. REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THOSE MARRIED OUT OF COMMUNITY OF 
PROPERTY PRE-1984/88 
What remedies, then, did our nurse wife have pre-1984/88? Primarily they were as 
follows: She could allege that she and her husband had established a universal 
partnership and that on dissolution of the marriage she was entitled to her share of the 
proceeds; She could claim maintenance for herself and/or she could claim 
maintenance for her dependent children; She could claim her half-share of the goods 
they had purchased jointly, as well as the goods he had bestowed upon her in the 
antenuptial contract. Between 1953 and 1976 she could claim the amount she had 
spent on household necessaries back from her husband; She could enforce a contract 
of services between them, if he had in fact agreed to employ her, and she could retain 
savings she had made from housekeeping money. All of these remedies had major 
drawbacks and I shall examine each in turn. 
4.1 UNIVERSAL PARTNERSHIP 
This was a primary method used prior to the introduction of a judicial discretion to 
redistribute assets to ameliorate the harsh effects of a complete division of assets. Our 
nurse wife could allege that, in terms of the law of contract, a universal partnership had 
been established between her and her doctor husband. 40 
4.1.1 The requirements for a universal partnership were set out in Milhlmann v 
Milhlmann 1981 (4) SA 632 (T) (and confirmed on appeal 1984 (3) SA 102 (A): 
a) each party must bring something into the partnership, or bind him/herself to 
bring something into it; 
b) the venture should be carried on for the joint benefit of the parties; 
c) the object should be to make a profit; and 
d) the partnership contract should be valid. 41 
40 Sinclair assisted by Heaton The Law of Marriage op cit p278-283. 
41 Sinclair assisted by Heaton The Law of Marriage op cit p279. See also Pezzutto v Dreyer 1992 
(3) SA 379 (A). 
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The contract may be tacit or express. Whether or not a tacit agreement has been 
reached is determined on a balance of probabilities.42 
4.1.2 This remedy was used with limited effectiveness before one could approach a 
court to order a redistribution of assets and there is no reason to believe it will be used 
more effectively now for the following reasons: 
4.1.2.21t is extremely difficult to establish that a tacit agreement to share profits did, 
indeed, exist. If it did, the obvious question is: why did the parties not enter into an 
express agreement to this effect? Surely the reason why the parties married out of 
community of property was because, certainly the economically more powerful party, 
had the express intention of not sharing the profits of their relationship; 
4.1.2.3 few women endeavouring to assert that a universal partnership has been 
established can afford the cost of litigation to do so. Also, where the value of the estate 
is not considerable, the cost of litigation will outweigh the benefits she is likely to 
receive. Given the difficulty of establishing that a universal partnership has been 
established, and the cost of doing so, unless the value of the estate is significant, few 
legal aid lawyers would embark on such litigation; 
4.1.2.4 it has been argued that a conservative court might find upholding such a 
contract to be contra bonos mores in as much as it might be tantamount to 
compensating a woman for the rendering of sexual services. 43 
42 Sinclair assisted by Heaton The Law of Marriage op cit p279. 
43 Sinclair assisted by Heaton The Law of Marriage p279-280. However, most writers agree that 
in the light of changing social values, this is an unlikely event. 
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4.2 SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE 
4.2.1 SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE PRIOR TO 1984/88 
There is a reciprocal duty of support between spouses. While it is ordinarily the 
husband who is ordered to support his wife, this is solely on account of his usually being 
the breadwinner. The duty usually ceased on divorce, but could continue if an order in 
terms of Section 10(1 )(1) of the Matrimonial Affairs Act 37 of 1953 were granted. Here 
the court could order the guilty spouse to maintain the innocent one. 44 
This was based on the principle that no one could escape his legal obligations by his 
own wrongdoing.45 Thus, if he deserted his wife without just cause or forced her to flee 
on account of his misconduct, he was obliged to continue to support her and vice 
versa.
46 He would also have to support her if she was unable to support herself and 
they did not enter into an agreement in terms of which he would not be liable to support 
her. 47 However, if his wife fled on account of his misbehaviour and then committed 
adultery, his duty to maintain her may cease, depending on how the court exercised its 
discretion. 48 While a husband was not liable to pay a wife arrear maintenance, unless 
they had entered into an agreement to this effect, if she had incurred debt in order to 
live, he was obliged to repay these. 49 
44 Boberg P Q R The Law of Persons and the Family Juta 1977 p250. I deliberately consulted 
the 1997 edition of Boberg here, which dealt with the pre-1984/88 position in respect of the duty 
of support between husband and wife. The more recent edition : Van Heerden, Cockerell, 
Keightley (eds) Boberg's Law of Persons and the Family 2ed Juta 1999 deals with the current law 
that pertains to the duty of support between husband and wife at p235-239. 
45 Hahlo The South African Law of Husband and Wife 5 ed Juta 1985 p136. 
46 Hahlo The South African Law of Husband and Wife op cit p136. 
47 Hahlo The South African Law of Husband and Wife op cit p136-137. 
48 Hahlo The South African Law of Husband and Wife op cit p137. 
49 Hahlo The South African Law of Husband and Wife op cit p137. 
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4.2.2 SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE POST-1984/8850 
With the movement away from a fault-based system of divorce heralded by the 
amendments to the Divorce Act in 1979, to a "no-fault" divorce system, the liability of the 
ex-husband to support his ex-wife diminished rapidly. There was also a move towards 
encouraging the parties to effect a "clean break", by severing their responsibilities to 
each other entirely at the time of the divorce. Simultaneously, along with women's 
apparent liberation, came the misguided view that shortly after a divorce a woman was 
able to achieve self-sufficiency. To assist her to re-acquire the skills she would need to 
become self-sufficient, the court would grant her "rehabilitative maintenance" or 
maintenance for a limited duration of time.51 The longer the marriage, the older she was 
and the more deskilled she had become over time, the more likely she was to receive 
maintenance. The court could grant her maintenance until her death or remarriage, but 
seldom did.52 
Weitzman53 reports a parallel trend in California. She notes that although there was a 
misperception that alimony was awarded far more frequently than it in fact was, 54 with 
5° For further reading regarding the present position in respect of spousal maintenance see: De Jong 
M "New Trends Regarding the Maintenance of Spouses on Divorce" THRHR Vol 62 No 1 February 
1999 p75-87; Van Zyl L "Spousal Support An Update" THRHR Vol 55 No 2 May 1992 p297-300; Van 
Zyl L "Post Divorce Support Theory and Practice" De Jure Vol 22 No 1 1989 p71-84. 
51 Van Zyl L "Maintenance" in Clark B (ed) Butterworths Family Law Service 2000 paragraph 29 p22-23. 
52 Weitzman L J "Alimony Its Premature Promse and Recent Resurgence in the United States" in 
Crites L L and Hepperle W L (eds) Women The Courts and Equality Skye Publications 1987 
p250-252. See fn 98. 
53 Weitzman L J "Alimony Its Premature Demise and Recent Resurgence in the United States" 
op cit p24 7-262 and Weitzman L J The Divorce Revolution The Unexpected Social and Economic 
Consequences for Women and Children in America The Free Press New York Collier Macmillan 
Publishers London 1985. 
54 Weitzman L J "Alimony Its Premature Demise and Recent Resurgence in the United States" 
op cit p247 and p258-260. 
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the introduction of a no-fault divorce system there was a decline in the number of 
alimony awards that were made, they were effective for a shorter period and women 
were assumed to be able to become self-sufficient quicker. 55 
Judges assumed homemakers could readily find well-paying jobs fairly soon after 
divorce. Weitzman quotes one judge as having said about a woman who had not 
taught in 20 years, nor had the appropriate teaching qualifications for the state in which 
she lived: 
"Just because she's been married 20 years doesn't mean she can be a sponge 
for the rest of her life. If she was once a teacher, she can always get a job 
teaching ... just because she hasn't taught in 20 years doesn't mean she can't 
teach. She is a teacher."56 
This prevalent attitude did not take cognisance of the social reality. Women frequently 
gave up or delayed their own education and job opportunities to assume home-making 
and child-rearing responsibilities and thereby permanently impaired their future earning 
capacity. 57 Weitzman refers to research that shows that for each year out of the paid 
labour market, a woman suffers a permanent lifelong reduced earning capacity of 1,2%. 
For college-educated women, the decrease can be as much as 4,3% each year. A two-
55 Weitzman L J Alimony Its Premature Demise and Recent Resurgence in the United States 
op cit p250-252. 
56 Weitzman L J Alimony Its Premature Demise and Recent Resurgence in the United States 
op cit p254. 
57 Rhode shows how the changing social climate clearly affected the way courts exercised their 
discretion, and how, among some judges, feminist strategies provoked an ill-disguised backlash. 
She cites the example of a Florida judge in 1972 reversing the modest alimony award to a 
48-year-old homemaker. The judge held that a woman could now be regarded "as fully equipped 
as a [man] to earn a living and provide for her essential needs ... In this era of women's liberation, 
we now have almost universally come to appreciate the fallacy of treating the demure members 
of our society as anything but on a basis of complete equality with the opposite sex". She wryly 
notes, however, that in avoiding that "fallacy" the court embraced another: the inequalities in 
men's and women's status following divorce. Rhode D L Justice and Gender: Sex Discrimination 
and the Law Harvard University Press 1989. See fn 101. 
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to four-year break will permanently lower an average woman's earnings by 13% and a 
five-year break will lower earnings by 19%.58 In addition to this loss of earnings, single 
parenthood after divorce leads to more interrupted work patterns, part-time employment 
and jobs with low prospects of promotion. This further curtails women's earning 
potential. While, happily for Californian women, Weitzman can report that recognition of 
these factors has resulted in a resurgence of alimony awards, 59 the same cannot be 
said for South Africa. The position of women in South Africa is even bleaker than for 
their Californian counterparts. Our nurse wife will face not only the impediments 
described above, but a colossal unemployment rate. And, if she is white, the additional 
barrier of employers being unable to employ her on account of affirmative action 
employment requirements. 
4.3 MAINTENANCE FOR THE DEPENDENT CHILDREN 
In a discussion about the judicial discretion to redistribute assets between spouses, 
mention of the support of children seems misplaced. Regrettably, however, the 
financial plight of a wife on divorce becomes the financial plight of the children, as in 
most instances, it is the wife who receives custody of the children. 60 Having custody of 
the children affects a wife on divorce adversely in principally three ways: 
58 Weitzman L J Alimony Its Premature Demise and Recent Resurgence in the United States 
op cit p254. 
59 Weitzman L J Alimony Its Premature Demise and Recent Resurgence in the United States 
op cit p254. See fn 12. 
60 Rhode notes that after divorce most men become single and most women become single 
parents. Three-fifths of all divorces involve minor children and the mothers receive custody in 
90% of all cases. Rhode Justice and Gender Discrimination and the Law op cit p151. For further 
reading regarding the hardships experienced by divorced single parents to maintain their children 
see : Armstrong A Struggling Over Scarce Resources: Women and Maintenance in Southern 
Africa Harare Zimbabwe University of Zimbabwe Publications 1992; South African Law 
Commission Review of the Maintenance System Issue Paper 5 Project 100 South African Law 
Commission 1997; South African Law Commission Interim report on Maintenance South African 
Law Commission Pretoria 1998. 
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4.3.1 By being principal caregiver, her prospects of having full-time employment with 
benefits such as medical aid, pension and promotion, are dramatically reduced. 61 
4.3.2 Even if her husband does pay maintenance, it seldom covers the actual cost of 
rearing a child. Rhode62 notes: 
"Few of these women [who receive custody] have obtained child support 
awards sufficient to meet the actual cost of child-rearing. In one survey, 
two-thirds of fathers had support obligations that were less than their 
monthly car payments. Not only have support awards been set at 
unrealistically low levels, their value has quickly fallen through inflation 
and non-compliance". 
4.3.3 In most instances, the husband pays less maintenance than he should or not at 
all. As Rhode reports63: Over half of all divorced men have failed to meet their 
spousal and child-support obligations. Arrearages have averaged between one-
half and three-fourths of the amounts due. Few decrees have required 
assistance for children over 18, and fathers have been less likely than mothers 
to provide it voluntarily, despite higher income levels. For many women, the 
legal cost of enforcing awards has been prohibitive. Only when non-payment 
reaches substantial levels have formal proceedings made sense, and at that 
point many judges have been willing to forego criminal sanctions or reduce 
amounts due in order to secure limited compliance. Because few courts require 
husbands to pay their wives' legal fees, legal remedies have cost more than they 
are worth. 
61 Rhode Justice and Gender Sex Discrimination and the Law op cit at p151 see fn 12. 
62 Rhode Justice and Gender Sex Discrimination and the Law op cit at p151. 
63 Rhode Justice and Gender Sex Discrimination and the Law op cit at p151. 
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Maintenance defaulting is a worldwide phenomenon.64 Clark65 notes that it is estimated 
that in the United States in 2000 AD, virtually all Americans living in poverty will be 
women and children and that the main cause of such poverty is inadequate child 
support. 
In America, Germany, England, Australia and New Zealand, attempts have been made 
to address this problem. 66 
Weitzman's67 research in California revealed two major problems with child support: low 
awards and inadequate enforcement. The US Census shows that the average award 
for two children in the United States is much less than half of the cost of raising them. 
In California, the average child support award is less than the average cost of daycare 
alone. The major burden of childcare is thus placed on the mother, even though she 
normally has fewer resources and much less ability to pay. Furthermore, even though 
child support awards are modest to begin with, they are frequently not paid because 
many divorced fathers simply ignore court orders. This is not because they cannot 
afford to pay. Most could, without seriously jeopardising their own standard of living. 
They do not, however, in large part because enforcement is so lax that non-compliance 
rarely incurs a penalty. Judges are excessively lenient, fail to order a direct deduction 
from the husband's salary and frequently waive arrears. They are also very disinclined 
to order imprisonment for non-compliance. As Weitzman wryly notes: "The present 
64 Van Zyl "Post-divorce Support - Theory and Practice" op cit p77, who notes that statistics from 
several countries show that on average, fewer than half of all maintenance orders are fully 
complied with. 
65 Clark B "Child Support: Public or Private" THRHR 1992 p277-286 at p278. 
66 Clark B "Comparative Legal Developments in Child Maintenance and Their Possible Effect 
on South Africa" CILSA 1993 p376-384. 
67 Weitzman L J Judicial Perceptions and Perceptions of Judges op cit p92-99. 
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legal system provides virtually every incentive for fathers not to pay child support."68 An 
additional cause is the unequal division of marital property on divorce.69 
The South African situation is, if anything, considerably worse than the Californian one 
Weitzman describes. In the South African Law Commission's Issue Paper on the 
Review of the Maintenance System in 199770 the problems are summarized: 
Complaints range from the treatment, attitudes and facilities encountered at 
maintenance courts by persons wishing to lay complaints, to the seeming 
impunity with which persons manage to evade their legal duty to maintain their 
dependents, even where maintenance orders are in force. The underlying 
problem seems to be a social attitude that believes there is no responsibility on 
persons to support their dependents, especially where children are brought up in 
single parent households. The low measure of social disapproval with which a 
non-custodial parent's failure to support his or her children is met (especially if 
the non-custodial parent is the father) is indicative of this attitude. This attitude 
has pervaded not only society in general, but also the administration of the 
maintenance system". 71 
Just as in California, although non-compliance constitutes a criminal offence, the courts 
have developed a tradition of routinely suspending sentences for the failure to comply 
with maintenance orders, irrespective of whether the sentence is a fine or period of 
imprisonment. The rationale behind this approach is a reluctance "to kill the goose that 
lays the golden eggs". 72 But the consequence is that defaulters know that it is unlikely 
that they will receive anything more serious than a suspended sentence. 73 Similarly, 
68 Weitzman L J Judicial Perceptions and Perceptions of Judges op cit p92-99. 
69 Weitzman L J Judicial Perceptions and Perceptions of Judges op cit p102-103. See fn 10. 
70 South African Law Commission Issue Paper 5 op cit. 
71 South African Law Commission Issue Paper 5 op cit pS-6. 
72 South African Law Commission Issue Paper 5 op cit p50. 
73 South African Law Commission Issue Paper 5 op cit p11. 
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although provision is made for interest to be charged on arrears, this is seldom, if ever, 
ordered. 74 
While the court can also issue a warrant of execution in respect of property, as well as a 
garnishee order authorizing payment against salary, these two remedies are also 
seldom granted. 75 
One of the major problems is the attitude of the maintenance court officials themselves. 
As a seasoned ex-magistrate with experience in maintenance matters commented76 : 
" ... Attorneys, prosecutors and magistrates alike, are of the belief that they are 
wasting their talents and time in the Maintenance Court . . . It has been my 
experience that, as a result of the impression created by senior officials and 
possibly inadvertently, by the Department itself, that maintenance enquiries are 
not really difficult or important, few ambitious prosecutors or magistrates wish to 
be part of these proceedings . . . Combine this with the prospect of the typical 
legal personality being required to enter into a more personal and emotional 
field, and the result is that officials moreover have to be compelled to work at the 
maintenance section - often to serve as a quid pro quo for some mistake they 
have made in another section". 
The stark reality, therefore, is that our nurse wife may well battle to get her doctor ex-
husband to support the children. And even if he does, the maintenance awarded will be 
considerably less than it really costs her to keep them. Freed of the physical and 
financial responsibility of the children that weighs her down, he becomes free to soar. 77 
74 South African Law Commission Issue Paper 5 op cit p11-12. 
75 South African Law Commission Issue Paper 5 op cit p12. 
76 South African Law Commission Issue Paper 5 op cit p8. 
77 Sinclair proposes the following solutions to the post-divorce poverty of women and their 
children: 
1. Laws and policies which inhibit the attainment of their potential in employment 
must be removed; 
2. the system of paid employment must be restructured to assist mothers discharge 
their child-care responsibilities; 
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4.4 CLAIMING HALF OF THE GOODS SHE AND HER HUSBAND PURCHASED 
JOINTLY 
In spite of parties being married out of community of property excluding any sharing, the 
parties could invoke sharing by registering property, for example, in both their names. 
In this case, in terms of the law of contract, the property belongs to both of them jointly. 
Hahlo asserts that where both spouses have contributed to the purchase of the 
matrimonial home on the understanding that it should belong to them jointly, but it was 
conveyed into the name of one spouse only, that spouse will be the legal owner, but as 
between spouses, joint ownership principles will apply. Few women, let alone 
attorneys, would have known that this principle applied. And even if they did, few 
women would have been in the financial position to institute the legal action required to 
assert their rights. Furthermore, the plaintiff, being the woman in this case, would bear 
the onus of proof in this instance, which would be a difficult one to discharge. 78 
Another fact, which may be better known to lawyers but is no better known by lay 
people, is that if the spouses are joint possessors of a thing and if one of them illicitly 
takes exclusive possession of it against the other's will, the latter has a spoliatory action 
against the former. 79 
3. fathers should learn to accept that they too are parents and should share child-
care responsibilities; 
4. our law should provide for a more equitable distribution of property on divorce to 
ensure financial security for dependent women and their children; 
5. better enforcement of duty of support between spouses and parents of their 
children, or the state pay and the creditor and state pursue the debtor; 
6. judges must be circumspect of the expectation that women can achieve financial 
independence imposed by the clean break principle; 
7. girls must be taught from the time they are girls to pursue their talents and that 
being a housewife is a luxury few can afford and the law cannot encourage; 
8. social security should cushion the effect of divorce and relationships. 
78 Hahlo HR The South African Law of Husband and Wife 5ed Juta 1985 p291. 
79 Hahlo HR The South African Law of Husband and Wife op cit p291. 
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4.5 CLAIMING THOSE GOODS HE HAD BESTOWED ON HER IN THE 
ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACT 
Whilst what a husband bestowed upon his wife in the antenuptial contract varied from 
marriage to marriage, it was invariably relatively valueless goods such as the contents of the 
matrimonial home, whose value was not amortised over time. While the moveables value 
depreciated over time, the value of the home appreciated. Regrettably, however, if the 
value of the house or its contents were not amortised in the antenuptial contract, their value 
to the wife diminished over time, just as the value of money did. 
4.6 CLAIMING BACK THE AMOUNT SHE HAD SPENT ON HOUSEHOLD 
NECESSARIES (APPLICABLE ONLY BETWEEN 1953 AND 1976) 
In terms of the common law, both spouses had a duty to contribute to the cost of 
necessaries pro rata their means. A spouse who bore more than his or her pro rata 
share could recover the excess with a right of recourse. Section 3 of the Matrimonial 
Affairs Act 37 of 1953 was enacted with the intention of making both spouses jointly and 
severally liable to the trader for debts for necessaries, regardless of who incurred it. 
However, the legislature went beyond the reciprocity of the duty of support, which the 
common law provided and gave the wife married out of community of property a full and 
unconditional right of recourse for money spent by her on household necessaries. This 
allowed women who spent their money on household necessaries to build up a claim 
against their husbands over many years for a refund of the full amount disbursed. This 
"mischief", which allowed for a wife to be reimbursed for doing no more than discharging 
her marital duty of support, was terminated in 1976 when the Matrimonial Affairs 
Amendment Act 13 of 1976 restored the common law position. For the period of its 
existence, however, it did give women a powerful negotiating tool to enforce a 
favourable divorce settlement. 80 
80 Sinclair J D An Introduction to the Matrimonial Property Act Juta 1984 p41-46. 
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6.1 ENFORCING AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN HER AND HER 
HUSBAND 
A husband's promise to pay his wife maintenance, an allowance or housekeeper's wage 
did not normally give rise to an enforceable contract. Also, in the absence of an 
express agreement, a wife who had worked as her husband's receptionist or 
bookkeeper had no claim against him. However, if he seriously undertook to employ his 
wife at a salary, then there was an enforceable contract between them. 81 
4.8 RETAINING HER SAVINGS FROM HOUSEKEEPING MONEY 
Where a marriage was in community, savings made and articles purchased by the wife 
out of her household allowance belonged to the joint estate. Where they were married 
out of community, they belonged to the husband unless the wife could show that he 
donated them to her. However, once she put the savings into a bank or building society 
account, only she could dispose of them.82 
Although deficient, all the remedies cited above - save that of reclaiming back from her 
husband what she had spent on household necessities - still apply. In fact, one new 
one has been added, where the cause of dissolution of the marriage is the death of her 
spouse rather than divorce. Prior to the enactment of the Maintenance of Surviving 
Spouses Act 27 of 1990, where the parties were married out of community of property 
with an express exclusion of the accrual system, a husband dying, by virtue of freedom 
of testation, could leave his wife penniless. 83 Since the reciprocal duty of support 
81 Hahlo The South African Law of Husband and Wife op cit p291. 
82 Hahlo The South African Law of Husband and Wife op cit p136. 
83 To add insult to injury, if his estate could not meet the cost of the last illness and the funeral, 
then his wife had to pay for them - the last gesture of a reciprocal duty of support. Hahlo The 
South African Law of Husband and Wife op cit p303. 
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between spouses terminates on death, she could not even claim maintenance from his 
deceased estate. Section 2(1) of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 
remedies this. It provides: 
"[l]f a marriage is dissolved by death after the commencement of this Act, the 
survivor shall have a claim against the estate of the deceased spouse for the 
provision of his reasonable maintenance needs until his death or remarriage in so 
far as he is not able to provide therefore from his own means and earnings."84 
5. THE WAY FORWARD 
How then can we rescue our nurse wife married out of community of property with an 
express exclusion of the accrual system post-1984/88? 
5.1 LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT TO EXTEND THE JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO 
MARRIAGES OUT OF COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY WITH AN EXPRESS 
EXCLUSION OF THE ACCRUAL SYSTEM AFTER 1984/88 
In spite of the defects of the existing redistribution remedy, 85 which I shall discuss in due 
course, extending it to women married out of community of property excluding accrual 
would somewhat alleviate their plight. It appears unlikely that the legislature will do this 
of its own volition: this option was canvassed when the Matrimonial Property Act was 
drafted as well as subsequently by the Law Commission in 1992,86 and on both 
occasions was rejected. This leaves us to pin our hopes on the Constitutional Court 
holding the arbitrary denial of this remedy to women married out of community of 
property excluding accrual solely by virtue of the date of their marriage to be in conflict 
with the equality clause in the Constitution. 87 
84 See Cronje D SP and Heaton J South African Family Law Butterworths 1999 p137-138. 
85 See fn 14 and p40-48. 
86 Law Commission Report on the amendment of section 7(3) of the Divorce Act op cit. 
87 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
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5.2 CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE ON ACCOUNT OF THE FAILURE TO 
EXTEND THE JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO REDISTRIBUTE ASSETS TO 
WOMEN MARRIED OUT OF COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY EXCLUDING THE 
ACCRUAL SYSTEM VIOLATES EQUALITY GUARANTEE IN THE 
CONSTITUTION 
Heaton88 argues that using the date of a marriage as the criterion for affording or 
denying a remedy violates the equality clause in the Constitution. Because the 
exclusion of accrual is normally at the insistence of the party whose estate will grow 
most, usually the husband, 89 it is invariably the woman who leaves the marriage empty-
handed. Furthermore, women's factual situation pre- and post-1984 is no different. 
Sinclair agrees: 
many couples are marrying after the two commencement dates, with 
antenuptial contracts which, by excluding the accrual system, are creating 
marriages in which no sharing of family assets takes place. Such a system was 
regarded by the legislature as unsatisfactory and sufficiently dangerous for and 
unfair to women for its harshness to have to be mitigated via the introduction of 
the discretion. Now there is developing another group of people, more often 
than not women, equally at risk, but who are denied the relief granted to their 
counterparts who married, fortuitously, before the cut-off dates. What argument 
can be advanced to justify the different treatment of people in identical 
circumstances? What can be adduced to palliate the sense of unfairness that 
women feel who are now emerging impecunious from broken marriages from 
which the accrual system was excluded?" (my italics)90 
88 Heaton J "Family Law and the Bill of Rights" in Bill of Rights Compendium Butterworths 1998 
at 3C-36-3C. 
89 See fn 6. 
90 Sinclair assisted by Heaton The Law of Marriage op cit p143-144. Dillon N DC "The Financial 
Consequences of Divorce S7(3) of the Divorce Act 1979 - A Comparative Study" C/LSA Vol XIX 
1986 p271-289 p276-277, observes that S7(3) of the Divorce Act only extends to those marriages 
entered into before November 1984 and thus in time will become defunct. Why this is so, he 
says, is difficult to understand. "The judicial discretion granted to the courts by S7(3) should, it is 
hoped, assist a spouse who finds him or herself bound by a contract made perhaps some 20 
years ago, entered into without proper, if any, legal advice, the consequences of which either of 
them did not comprehend or even contemplate. However, post-1984 spouses who find 
themselves in the same position will find no assistance from S7(3). The legislators have 
recognised a social evil that existed before 1 November 1984 and have acted to eradicate that 
evil. Why have they not done the same for those spouses married after 1984? The mere 
introduction by the Matrimonial Property Act of an alternative, statutorily defined matrimonial 
regime - that of the community of accruals - does not prevent persons from choosing, or from 
being badly advised to choose, a regime of strict separation of property (expressly excluding the 
34 
Those who believe the limitation of the judicial discretion will withstand constitutional 
scrutiny believe that it can be justified in terms of the limitation clause on two counts. 
First, on the basis of contractual freedom. 91 Sinclair is skeptical of this. 92 She 
caustically notes that the legislature did not hesitate to interfere with the parties' 
contractual freedom in 1984 or 1988, so it should not hesitate on this score now. 93 The 
only difference between the position of women married out of community of property 
pre-1984/88 and those married out of community of property with an express exclusion 
of the accrual system post-1984/88 is that in the latter case, women had an additional 
option available to them. 94 But having more choices in no way means that women post-
1984/88 better able to exercise them than their predecessors95 . The parties are not in 
an equal bargaining position and the wishes of the person (usually the prospective 
husband) who is in the superior financial positions will usually prevail. 96 Sinclair is 
unequivocal: 
regime of accruals). It is submitted, with respect, that there is very little difference between 
choosing to be under a regime of separation of property (excluding accruals) before the Act or 
after it. They both require a deliberate choice. The introduction of the statutorily defined regime 
of accruals merely informs the marrying public, for those who do not already know, of a further 
option in matrimonial property regimes that they choose in preference to the two more traditional 
regimes. Consequently, there appears to be no good cause for maintaining that the relief 
afforded by S7(3) shall become obsolete merely with the introduction of the optional new accrual 
regime. 
"Van Wyk believes that the imposition of the system of accrual-sharing will force couples to 
consider both the demerits and merits of total separation, which should lead to a 'more informed 
choice'. Undoubtedly this shall be so. However, the form of relief provided by S7(3) is not 
designed to protect those who have made an 'informed' choice - it is to protect those who 
contracted, for whatever reason, be it ignorance, coercion or even foolishness, to their 
disadvantage. In all probability, such ill-informed choices will continue to be made after 
1 November 1984." 
91 Sinclair assisted by Heaton The Law of Marriage op cit p145. 
92 Sinclair assisted by Heaton The Law of Marriage op cit p143. 
93 Sinclair assisted by Heaton The Law of Marriage op cit p146. 
94 Sinclair assisted by Heaton The Law of Marriage op cit p146-7. 
95 Sinclair assisted by Heaton The Law of Marriage op cit p147. See p2-4. 
96 Sinclair assisted by Heaton The Law of Marriage op cit p147. 
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"The date of the marriage cannot serve to differentiate between people in 
identical circumstances. The Constitutional Court should strike down this 
criterion because it is arbitrary; it unfairly discriminates against people married 
according to the system of complete separation of property on the ground of the 
date of their marriage. The discrimination takes the form of denying to those 
people a remedy to relieve an injustice that is granted to persons married with an 
identical system, but earlier. That the differentiation has a disparate unfair 
impact on women is a further possible ground for attack, but a harder one to 
substantiate."97 
One could argue that women have become more aware of their rights in the years since 
1984/8 and that they are now able to make an informed choice. Is it not paternalistic to 
assert that women require a judge to be able to exercise his or her discretion and come 
to their aid where they have entered into an agreement that is to their disadvantage? I 
do not think this view is correct. While women have attained formal equality on many 
levels, 98 the substantive reality for many women remains unchanged. 99 Fineman 100 
97 Sinclair assisted by Heaton The Law of Marriage op cit p147-8. 
98 De Jong points out that formal equality for women in South Africa started gradually at first but 
very rapidly from the end of 1993 onwards: 
"For example, the General Law Fourth Amendment Act of 1993 finally abolished the 
marital power in toto and achieved formal equality between men and women in a number 
of spheres. Similarly, the Guardianship Act of 1993 accorded equal status to mothers in 
regard to guardianship of their children. And in the employment sphere, labour legislation 
such as the Wages Act, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act and the Labour 
Relations Act has outlawed unfair discrimination based on sex. Of course, the interim 
Constitution of 1993 and the final Constitution of 1996 are also of great significance in 
this regard." 
De Jong M "New Trends Regarding the Maintenance of Spouses Upon Divorce" (62) THRHR 
1999 p77-78. 
99 Albertyn chronicles women's inequality in South Africa: 
"Women in South Africa tend to be poorer than men. They own less property, earn less 
income per capita and are more likely to be unemployed. When they are employed 
women are concentrated at the bottom of the employment scale. They generally earn 
less than their male counterparts and receive unequal benefits, subsidies and recognition 
on the basis of gender and marital status. The universities and civil service are perhaps 
the more visible example of this ... Women predominate in marginal and unprotected 
spheres of work. For example, many African and working class women are employed as 
domestic servants in the rural areas, in part-time work and in the informal sector where 
such employment benefits as job security, pensions and maternity benefits are not 
available to them. 
36 
points out that after more than two decades there is no evidence that the situation has 
become much better for the majority of women. In fact, she says there are indications 
that it has become, or will get, worse. She cites the findings of Victor Fuchs 101 who says 
that: 
"My most important empirical finding is that the gap between women and men in 
economic well-being was no smaller in 1986 than in 1960 ... The women/men 
ratio of money income almost doubled, but women had less leisure while men 
had more, an increase in the population of adults not married made women 
dependent on their own income, and women's share of financial responsibility for 
child-care rose. A striking exception is the experience of young, White, 
unmarried, well-educated women who made large gains relative to their male 
Women's labour in the home is unpaid and unrecognized ... It is not recognized in writing 
divorce agreements or in sums awarded in damages claims. It is not recognized in the 
Gross Domestic Product, yet it frees male workers to be productive and fuels the 
economy. 
Despite women's inferior economic status statistics tell us that women work harder than 
men whether they are housewives or job holders in the 'double shift' in the workplace and 
at home. According to the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs in the USA, women who 
represent about 50% of the world's population, perform nearly two-thirds of all the 
working hours, receive one-tenth of the world's income and own less than 1 % of the 
world's property ... 
. . . [W]omen are more likely to be the victims of violence often by their male partners. It 
is estimated that one in six women is battered by her male partner and that one in three 
women is raped or sexually assaulted in her lifetime ... 
Women are less likely to occupy positions of power in the workplace, the home, in the 
street or in the public world of politics and culture". 
Albertyn C Achieving Equality for Women The Limits of a Bill of Rights Centre for Applied Legal 
Studies University of the Witwatersrand June 1992 p3-6. 
Kaganas and Murray also warn against the equating of formal with substantive equality. They 
point out that Hahlo made this inaccurate assumption: noting women's franchise, the opening up 
of the universities and professions and women's increased activity in the workforce, he appeared 
to believe that gender equality had largely been achieved. But, they warn, formal equality is 
insufficient to eliminate women's disadvantages and the assumption that it does prejudices them. 
It has led to the withdrawal of protection or assistance previously offered to women. Thus a 
woman who can support herself on divorce must not expect to receive maintenance. Even if a 
woman has devoted herself to home and family for years, the courts are loathe to give her 
lifelong maintenance. They give her 'rehabilitative maintenance' for a limited period of time until 
she can re-enter the job market. The truth is for the many reasons discussed elsewhere in this 
dissertation, this is very difficult for her to do. Gender and the New South African Legal Order 
Bennett TW et al (eds) Juta 1994 p11 and 14. 
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° Fineman MA The Illusion of Equality: The Rhetoric and Reality of Divorce Reform University 
of Chicago Press Chicago and London p37. 
101 Fineman MA The Illusion of Equality op cit p37-38. 
102 
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counterparts . . . Most of these women are childless; those who are mothers 
frequently live under great pressure". 102 
Fineman cautions against the premature assumption of women's independence. She records 
the transition from a patriarchal view of the family where the husband was responsible for the 
financial well-being of his family to an egalitarian or equality one where the husband and wife 
share responsibility. With this new attitude comes the view of marriage as a partnership rather 
than as a relationship where one partner is dependent on the other. As far as the rules of 
property division go, this change in attitude has resulted in entitlement based on earnings, or 
material contributions, be they economic or homemaking rather than need becoming the most 
important consideration. Fineman expresses concern that making contribution paramount and 
expecting the parties to contribute equally, we are disregarding the material circumstances of 
women. While she acknowledges the reasons why liberal feminist legal reforms wish to shed the 
view of a dependent woman as victim, which is demeaning, she feels that the polar extreme -
that of the equal partner in an egalitarian marriage does not take into account the range of other 
alternatives in between: 
"If one rejects the comprehensiveness of either or both of the conflicting images of 
marriage that the stereotypes of women are equal and woman as dependent represent, 
one must confront the reality that many women whose mixed circumstances may require 
remedial rules are neglected. The stereotypes of dependency and partnership are polar 
opposites. Thus no single, typical result can be fairly reconciled with the goal of doing 
justice to both. A woman who operates in both the marriage and the market as an equal 
might be better off under the old common law system, where she keeps her separate 
property, and her ex-husband is liable only for child support. The true dependent, by 
contrast, might by her very circumstances have been able to claim all of the property and 
still be found in need of continued support for herself. In either case, it would seem that 
what is desirable in the way of reform is the creation of a range of acceptable economic 
outcomes which could accommodate a variety of differences among women in various 
circumstances. The focus on the stereotypes of dependency and equality and the futile 
attempt to reconcile them tend to narrow rather than expand the definition of acceptable 
results". 
Fineman warns of the dangers of adhering to the concept of equality. Equality demands 
sameness of treatment and differentiation in any sphere may be seen as an acknowledgement of 
inferiority. A commitment to equality encourages its proponents to minimize or deny difference. 
This results in the minimizing or denying of the differences between men and women's needs on 
divorce in spite of startling statistical evidence to the contrary. 
In order to ensure true equality often, on divorce, women need to receive more than the strict 
division that the equality concept will allow. Thus equality has superceded equity. As Fineman 
records: 
"Simplistic, rule - equality changes in divorce laws premised on an unrealized egalitarian 
marriage will tend to further impoverish women and their children. Under such laws, 
divorced women are to assume sole economic responsibility for themselves and joint 
economic responsibility for their children. Theoretically, this requirement is fair because 
divorced women will assume this responsibility under the same terms and conditions as 
their ex-spouses. Equal treatment in divorce, however, can only be fair if spouses have 
access to equal resources and have equivalent needs. Realistically, many women do not 
have such economic advantages. In addition, they continue to care for children." 
Fineman MA The Illusion of equality op cit p38, 40, 42, 45-47, 52. See fn 127. 
For Rhode neither the equality, nor the equitable model offer a solution. She concurs with 
Fineman that equality in form does not equate equality in fact. She says that both formulations, 
namely that divorces statutes should presumptively mandate "equal" division of marital assets or 
that courts should retain discretion to make "equitable" allocations, are defensible in theory but 
neither are in practice. Judges, when exercising their discretion, have done so in an 
38 
A second justification for retaining the limited judicial discretion is that not to do so 
would result in uncertainty regarding the outcome on divorce. Both Heaton 103 and 
Sinclair104 comment that uncertainty is preferable to the "irremediable harshness" of a 
complete separation of property. Furthermore, since 1984/88 there has not been a 
flood of litigation arising out of the granting of judicial discretion. 105 What it has done is 
equalise the parties' negotiating positions so that at roundtable conferences and divorce 
mediation sessions, the fruits of both their labour are shared more equally. 
Our constitution provides the basis on which to transform our society into a more 
egalitarian one. What is required in order to do this is a complete restructuring of 
society through the redistribution of power and resources, as well as through the 
eradication of systemic disadvantage. 106 The Constitutional Court has delivered several 
idiosyncratic, gender biased fashion, whereas the 'equal' division ignores unequal needs, 
responsibilities and opportunities confronting men and women. She proposes that state assume 
greater responsibility: 
" ... we [cannot] continue denying public responsibility to reduce the private suffering that 
divorce entails. Many couples lack adequate assets to maintain two separate 
households. Most men remarry usually within a few years after divorce, and incur new 
family obligations. When the pie is sufficiently small, changing the size of the slices is an 
inadequate approach. As experience in other countries suggests, even with more 
equitable property allocation standards and efficient child support mechanisms, many 
single-parent families will still need government assistance. The difficulties of divorcing 
women cannot be met solely through divorce law. They reflect broader societal problems 
calling for broader societal responses concerning employment, welfare, childcare, and 
related issues". 
Rhode Justice and Gender, Sex Discrimination and the Law op cit p154. 
103 Heaton Family Law and the Bill of Rights op cit p36-37. 
104 Sinclair assisted by Heaton The Law of Marriage op cit p145. 
105 Sinclair assisted by Heaton The Law of Marriage op cit p145-146; Heaton "Family Law and 
the Bill of Rights" op cit 3C 37-38. 
106 Direct sex discrimination is any policy or action, which discriminates overtly on the basis of 
sex. Indirect sex discrimination occurs where a policy or action may be gender-neutral in 
appearance, but have very different effects on women and men. Systemic sex discrimination is 
discrimination that has seeped into the very fabric of our society. Historical and cultural 
assumptions about the proper roles of women and men in society have a continuing effect in 
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judgments in which it has indicated that equality must be understood substantively 
rather than formally. 107 
If the Constitutional Court is to be true to the spirit of the Constitution - that is, to ensure 
that real equality is to be achieved - then it must find that because women and men 
are in reality not equal bargaining partners, inequality will be wrought if they are to be 
formally treated as such. While the Constitutional Court cannot transform the social 
reality, it can take it into account. By recognising the social inequality between men and 
women and, thereby, the legislature's failure to extend the judicial discretion after 
1984/88, it will call for a greater measure of justice to be done between the parties. 108 
While I believe that extending judicial discretion to marriages will go some way towards 
alleviating the plight of women married out of community of property excluding accrual, I 
do not want to suggest that I perceive it to be a panacea. In its existing form, it has 
serious limitations. 
shaping expectations. When the dominant view is that women are subordinate to men, women 
may be led to accept less than their entitlements. This enables long-standing inequality to be 
perpetuated. It infects every aspect of one's life. Australian Law Commission Discussion Paper 
54 1993 entitled "Equality Before the Law" paras 3.24-3.26; as well as para 3.11-13. 
107 Albertyn and Goldblatt refer to Brink v Kitshoff 1996 (5) BCLR 752 (CC) where O'Regan J 
spoke of group disadvantage, thereby acknowledging systemic discrimination (at p256); Harksen 
v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) in which O'Regan J, when examining whether section 21 of the 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 was unconstitutional, looked at the impact it would have on married 
people. She considered the discrimination suffered by married women in particular because of 
gender stereotypes and inequalities (at p203); President of the RSA v Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC) 
where Goldstone J and O'Regan J concurred that women's disproportionate childcare 
responsibility is one of the major causes of women's inequality in our society (at p264). Albertyn 
C and Goldblatt B "Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the Development of an 
Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality" SAJHR 1995 p248-276. 
108 For further reading regarding the attainment of substantive equality for women using the 
Constitution see : Albertyn C Achieving Equality for Women : The Limits of a Bill of Rights Centre 
for Applied Legal Studies University of Witwatersrand 1992; Bekker J C "Interaction Between 
Constitutional Reform and Family Law" Acta Juridica 1991 p1-17; Camerer S "Equal Before the 
Law: A Woman's View of a Bill of Human Rights" De Rebus No 305 May 1993 p422-425; Van 
der Walt A J and Botha H "Coming to Grips with the New Constitutional Order : Critical 
Comments on Harksen v Lane" SA Public Law Vol 13 No 1 1998 p17-41 . 
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6. LIMITATIONS OF THE EXISTING REDISTRIBUTION PROVISION 
6.1 THE LIMITS IMPOSED IN SECTION 7(3) OF THE DIVORCE ACT ITSELF 
In the first instance, the judicial discretion is limited by the requirements of s7(3) itself. 
A court can only exercise its discretion where: 
6.1.1 the spouses (Whites, Coloureds and Indians) were married before 1 November 
1984 in terms of an antenuptial contract which excludes community of property 
and community of profit and loss without any type of accrual system; or 
6.1.2 the spouses (Blacks) were married before 2 December 1988 in terms of s22(6) 
of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927; and 
6.1.3 the parties to these marriages have not reached an agreement on the 
distribution of their assets. 
6.2 THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 7(4) OF THE DIVORCE ACT 
In the second instance, before a court can exercise its discretion, it must be satisfied 
that the spouse in favour of whom the order is granted must have made a direct or 
indirect contribution to the maintenance or increase of the estate of the other spouse. 
The contribution may be made "by the rendering of services, or the saving of expenses, 
which would otherwise have been incurred, or in any other manner''. The court must be 
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further satisfied that on account of the contribution, it is "equitable and just" to order the 
redistribution of assets. 109 
What constitutes a contribution was considered by the Appellate Division in Kritzinger v 
Kritzinger 1989 ( 1) SA 67 (A) to be 110: 
"some positive act by means of which one spouse puts something into the 
maintenance or increase of the estate of the other spouse, whether by way of 
money or property, labour or skill" (at 88 C-D). 
Mr Kritzinger claimed that by virtue of foregoing a promotion, which would have taken 
him out of the country, in order to prioritise his wife's career advancement, he was 
entitled to a share of her estate in terms of Section 7(3) of the Divorce Act. The trial 
court awarded him a share of her estate. 111 The Appellate Division, however, overruled 
this decision. Milne J A held that by foregoing the promotion he had given up nothing 
109 Sections 7(4) and (5) of the Divorce Act provide: 
"(4) an order under subsection (3) (see fn 15) shall not be granted unless the court is satisfied that 
it is equitable and just by reason of the fact that the party in whose favour the order is granted, 
contributed directly or indirectly to the maintenance or increase of the estate of the other party 
during the subsistence of the marriage, either by the rendering of services, or the saving of 
expenses which would otherwise have been incurred, or in any other manner. 
(5) In the determination of the assets or part of the assets to be transferred as contemplated in 
subsection (3), the court shall, apart from any direct or indirect contribution made by the party 
concerned to the maintenance or increase of the estate of the other party as contemplated in 
subsection (4), also take into account -
(a) the existing means and obligations of the parties including an obligation that 
a husband to a marriage as contemplated in subsection 3(b) of this section 
may have in terms of section 22(7) of the Black Administration Act 1927 (Act 
No. 38 of 1927); 
(b) any donation made by one party to the other during the subsistence of the 
marriage, or which is owing and enforceable in terms of the antenuptial 
contract concerned; 
(c) any other factor which should in the opinion of the court be taken into 
account." 
110 Annual Survey of South African Law 1989 Juta p202-26. For further reading on how the 
courts have interpreted what constitutes a contribution see : Bedil S "What is a contribution?" 
Annual Survey of South African Law 1987 p104-106. 
111 Kritzinger v Kritzinger 1983 (4) SA 85 (C). 
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(at 86H) on account of having enjoyed a higher standard of living with his wife than he 
would have, had he accepted the promotion. 
Lind feels that, on the face of it, this argument is appealing. 112 However, " ... the 
sacrifice he made related to the potential for his own separate estate to increase ... 
"Even though Mr Kritzinger decided to turn down the overseas promotion 
because he felt he would enjoy a higher standard of living with his wife, his 
separate estate did not benefit from that decision. Therefore, he gave up the 
actual - not speculative - prospect of earning more and thereby building up a 
larger estate. This was an actual sacrifice that enabled his wife to accumulate 
the estate she accumulated during the remaining years of their marriage" .113 
Milne J A stated further that a sacrifice did not qualify as a contribution to the 
maintenance or increase of the estate of the other spouse as required by the Act for the 
judicial discretion to come into operation. He asserted that what the legislature meant 
by a contribution was some positive act be done by way of assistance. 114 
However, as Lind points out, 115 the discretion is an equitable one. Its purpose is to do 
justice between the parties where it would be unfair to strictly apply the matrimonial 
property regime chosen by the parties at the time of the marriage. He concludes that 
Milne J A's approach is too narrow. Lind laments 116: 
"A regrettable feature of our legislation is that it allows for an equitable discretion 
only where a contribution is made. There may be circumstances where equity 
would demand a redistribution even where there was no contribution at all. To 
112 Lind C "Divorce - and property sharing" Vol 18 Businessman's Law 1989 p231-234 at p233. 
113 Lind C "Divorce - and property sharing" op cit p233. 
114 Lind C "Divorce - and property sharing" op cit p233. 
115 Lind C "Divorce - and property sharing" op cit p233. 
116 Lind C "Divorce - and property sharing" op cit p234. 
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limit the discretion to redistribute property even further, as Milne JA does, is to 
deprive the court of the opportunity of doing justice where there is a demand for 
it. What is the court going to say to the wife who has made no contribution to 
her husband's estate, except for 20 years, to bow to his whim that she remain at 
home embroidering during the day, ready to play the piano and sing to him at 
night when he has enjoyed the dinner prepared for him by his servants? Is she 
to be denied a share of his fortune when he tires of her?" 
Sinclair117 believes that need, rather than contribution, should be the pre-eminent criteria 
for redistributing marital property. A contribution should be used to determine the extent 
of the redistribution only. 118 She notes that, otherwise, "only healthy women, who can 
work in the home and save their husband's expenses that would otherwise have been 
incurred, or who can participate in the labour market, may benefit from the new 
dispensation". 119 
Clark and Van Heerden 120 agree. In their view, the only precondition to the exercise of 
the discretion should be that on the facts of the individual case, a redistribution order is 
necessary to do justice between the parties. In its present form, they warn: 
"A spouse who sacrifices his or her career to advance that of the other spouse, 
in the expectation of sharing in the financial benefits gained by the other in the 
course of such career, may find that his or her sacrifice goes unrewarded, even 
in a case where justice requires that some sharing should take place."121 
117 Sinclair An Introduction to the Matrimonial Property Act 1984 op cit pSO. 
118 Sinclair An Introduction to the Matrimonial Property Act 1984 op cit pS0-52. 
119 Sinclair An Introduction to the Matrimonial Property Act 1984 op cit p52. 
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° Clark B and Van Heerden B J "Asset Redistribution on Divorce - The Exercise of Judicial 
Discretion" SALJ Vol 106 1989 p243-249 especially p246-7. 
121 Clark and Van Heerden "Asset Redistribution on Divorce" op cit p249. 
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Thus, doing justice between the parties should be the overriding consideration, and not 
the strict entitlement of the parties. 122 
In Kritzinger v Kritzinger 1989 (1) SA 67 (A), by expressly rejecting the notion that the 
husband's career sacrifices constituted a "contribution", the court flew in the face of a 
universal trend to broaden the definition of property. 123 
Weitzman 124 notes that research in the United States indicates that most divorcing 
couples have very little property. But they do have another form of wealth: career 
assets - their earning capacities and the benefits and entitlements of their employment 
such as their pensions, medical insurance and social security. These assets are often 
more valuable than the tangible assets they acquired in the course of the marriage. 
She notes that today people invest in human capital and careers. The "new property" 
that results from these investments includes enhanced earning capacities, pensions and 
job-related benefits. She argues that since these forms of property are often the major 
assets acquired during marriage, they should be recognised as part of marital property 
and divided on divorce because they are joint property. It is impossible to have an 
equitable division of marital property if they are not divided as they are acquired through 
joint time, energy and money. Usually the wife abandons her own education to help her 
husband establish his career. She may leave her job to move with him, use her skills to 
assist him unpaid, or assume the major share of the child-rearing responsibility. Thus, 
both parties make an investment in the husband's career. Career assets are also a 
122 Sinclair J D, "Divorce and the Judicial Discretion - In Search of the Middle Ground" SALJ Vol. 
106 1989 p249-59. 
123 See Sinclair An Introduction to the Matrimonial Property Act 1984 op cit p69-72. 
124 Weitzman L J "Marital Property: Its Transformation and Division in the United States" in 
Economic Consequences of Divorce Weitzman L J and McClean M (eds) Clarendon Press 
Oxford 1992 p85-142 at p105-108. See fn 10. 
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form of deferred compensation for work performed during the marriage. Career assets 
such as pension benefits accrue only later on in the marriage. Most importantly, 
marriage is a partnership, so that usually the husband's career is a product of the 
parties' combined effort. Had she not sacrificed her career to assume family 
responsibilities that he otherwise would have to undertake, for example, he would not 
have achieved the lofty heights he did. Another example of a career asset, the 
accolades for which must go to both parties, is a professional degree. While a 
university education is expensive in terms of investing one's time and resources, it 
yields a valuable return in future income. Especially when undertaken during the 
marriage or when undertaken beforehand, but paid for during the marriage, both parties 
contribute to its acquisition and hence both should reap the rewards. If a division does 
not occur, usually the husband will receive a windfall of the entire benefit of the couple's 
joint investment of both time and money. 125 The sacrifices in her own career she made 
at the time can never be recouped. 
Although in South Africa in terms of S7(7)a of the Divorce Act, the pension interest of a 
party is deemed to be part of his or her assets, thereby recognising this career asset for 
what it is, regrettably the same cannot be said for career assets such as other 
retirement benefits, a professional education, enhanced earning capacity, goodwill of 
husband's business and his entitlement to company goods and services. 
125 O'Sullivan M "Stereotyping and Male Identification: Keeping Women in Their Place" 1994 
Acta Juridica p185-201 p123-134 generally p123-125 particularly. 
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6.3 ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE EXISTING REDISTRIBUTION PROVISION 
Alex Costa 126 points out other failings in the existing redistribution provision. He 
questions why it should be necessary to show that the estate of the other spouse has 
been maintained or increased. He believes that it is inequitable that one spouse should 
be prejudiced simply because the other spouse has diminished his estate, for example, 
by gambling. He also believes the laudable intent of redistribution can be circumvented 
where a wealthy husband creates a trust for the benefit of his children and thereby pegs 
the value of his estate. He argues that such structures should be ignored for purposes 
of a redistribution order. 
For me, less obvious than the defects in the redistribution provision itself, is the way in 
which it has been applied by the courts. 127 From analysing excerpts of seven divorce 
126 Costa A, "A plea for the Reform of Section 7(3) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 as Amended" 
1990 De Rebus p921. 
127 Scutt examines how judicial bias, as a result of their socialization, causes judges to value 
husbands' and wives' contributions differently (p211-212). Judges' failure to equate men and 
women's contributions are, she says, more a product of their having been raised in a sexist 
society that is a result of malice (p212). This is compounded by our society's attitude towards 
money resulting in monetary contributions being seen as more valuable than non-monetary 
contributions, and paid work being more valuable than unpaid work (p212). Even where the wife 
works in the husband's business, her contribution is devalued. Scutt uses Mallett v Mallett (1984) 
156 CLR 605 as an example (p216-218). When 'hostessing', Mrs Mallett is seen as having fun at 
dinner parties, whereas many a business deal is done over dinner (p217). 'Doing the books' and 
'answering the phone', and 'keeping a business diary' are all essential to the running of the 
business, yet all of these contributions by Mrs Mallett were considered unremarkable (p217-218). 
While it was her efforts during these 'unremarkable functions' that kept the operation going, her 
husband got all the recognition for his entrepreneurial flair ( p218). Scutt (p246-247) says one of 
the reasons women's work is devalued is on account of 'the myth of women's dependency': 
"This myth of dependence has succeeded in establishing women who work (hard) in the 
home, for no monetary reward, as 'dependents'. For a woman who cleans, cooks, 
washes, vacuums; plays the efficient and charming hostess to business colleagues and 
family friends; uses her energies and resourcefulness in building up a business or farm; 
cares lovingly and effectively for the children, often on a 24-hour basis; psychologically 
supports and ministers to her spouse, the idea that she is a 'dependent' is a wry jest. 
The myth of dependency renders assessments of women's contribution to the marital 
assets less than those made of men's contribution. As men are accepted as independent 
beings, it follows naturally in traditional thought that they should be assumed to do all the 
work on their own; build up the business alone; work the farm without wifely assistance; 
contribute all the business acumen (which women are seen to be lacking, falsely of 
course). This ignores two realities: first, the reality that women work hard at home, and 
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judgments, O'Sullivan 128 concludes that judges reward women" ... for whom motherhood 
is the only appropriate goal, who remains at home participating in a limited range of 
activities in the domestic sphere, who does not assume positions of authority and 
whose chastity is unassailable", 129 and disadvantage other women. Career women are 
positively punished. In Kritzinger v Kritzinger 1983 (4) SA 85 (C) at p91, Berman J 
described Mrs Kritzinger: 
"Plaintiff, on the other hand, was - in the modern idiom - something else. At first 
sight, and initially when examined by her counsel, she came across as an 
attractive, sweetly smiling, soft-spoken ordinary housewife in her late 30s. Such 
a description, however, completely belies the truth of the matter ... She created -
whilst in the witness box (and left when she stood down) - an impression of a 
formidable and resolute lady, who not for nothing had been chosen as 
Businesswoman of the Year on her appointment as managing director of Clicks, 
a very large and enterprising chain of retail stores; she is - in the best sense of 
often work equally hard in the paid workforce; that men give little assistance at home, 
mostly expending their energies in the paid workforce alone. And secondly, the reality 
that men do not 'do it alone', do not possess business acumen in isolation from their 
discussions about business with their wives, in isolation from the psychological support, 
comfort and care they receive daily on the home ground, which makes their life in the 
paid workforce easier to organize and sustain (p246) . 
. . . For the woman in part-time employment, the dependency myth ensures that the part-
time work is seen as trivial, of little moment (rather than the hard work it really is, with 
inadequate return) and thus not worth any proper assessment in considering contribution 
to marital assets ... 
For women engaging in full-time paid employment, it is not recognized that they are 
required to carry out two full-time jobs: that in the home, that in the paid workplace; whilst 
the husband is in legal interpretation entitled to have his contribution seen as exceptional 
when he engages in business alone (and as founded upon his own entrepreneurial flair 
and skill) failing to make an equal contribution to the home and family life through 
housework, homecare, childcare. 
. .. Women must again work positively to renounce this falsified picture of women, 
marriage and the real world . . . Women contribute on psychological levels, by hard work 
in the home, by caring, by injection of finances (large proportions of women engage as 
women always have, in paid work, many part-time). Marriage is an interdependent 
relationship: the parties are each dependent upon the other in various ways; the ways 
may vary, the situations may vary, the personalities may vary, but marriage is about 
interdependency between two adult human beings living together in a family; it is not 
about one person being a 'dependent', the other being quite independent' {p247). Scutt 
J Women and the Law Commentary and Materials The Law Book Company Ltd 1990. 
128 O'Sullivan M "Stereotyping and Male Identification" op cit p185-201. 
129 O'Sullivan M "Stereotyping and Male Identification" op cit p190. 
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the latter-day epithet - Thatcheresque, a woman more to be admired than 
loved."130 
O'Sullivan observes that there is a judicial perception that women cannot 
simultaneously conduct successful careers and maintain the role of a good wife. This 
results in the judges attributing the breakdown of the marriages to the wives. However, 
there is also a class dimension: whilst there is a strong disapproval of middle-class 
wives engaging in careers in the public sphere, there is a presumption that lower-class 
and working class women should be employed. 131 
O'Sullivan concludes: 
"The result of gender bias in the drafting, application and interpretation of law is 
that women suffer discriminatory treatment at the hands of the justice system. A 
system that suffers from gender bias fails in its primary duty to administer justice 
fairly and impartially. As a consequence, the whole of the justice system suffers 
as its legitimacy is brought into question ... [F]ormal legal recognition of equality 
will not automatically achieve equality in practice. Positive steps have to be 
undertaken to ensure that formal legal equality promotes equality in practice in 
women's lives". 132 
7. CONCLUSION 
The legislature, recognising the enormous hardship wrought upon women and children 
by a complete separation of property, threw them a lifejacket in the form of a judicial 
discretion to redistribute benefits to them. Having rescued them, however, they 
removed the lifeboats from the water and sailed away, leaving the women married in 
precisely the same way, only later, to drown. 
130 O'Sullivan M "Stereotyping and Male Identification" op cit p194-195. 
131 O'Sullivan M "Stereotyping and Male Identification" op cit p196. 
132 O'Sullivan M, "Stereotyping and Male Identification" op cit p200. 
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And while I concede there are difficulties with the existing redistribution provision, it is 
certainly better than nothing at all. The first prize for women married out of community 
of property excluding the accrual system would be for the Constitutional Court to 
declare that the redistribution provision's applicability to women married out of 
community of property prior to 1984/88 only, violates the right of everyone to be equal 
before the law and to have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law133 and to 
suspend the declaration of invalidity to allow a competent authority to rectify the 
deficiency. 134 
This would afford the legislature not only an opportunity to extend the redistribution 
remedy to women married out of community excluding accrual after 1984/88 - and 
arguably to every situation where an injustice may arise if judicial discretion did not exist 
- but also to address the many other deficiencies with the existing redistribution 
provision that I have referred to elsewhere. 
I echo a final plea by Costa: 
"Marriage must be seen as a form of partnership in which the spouses contribute 
their respective skills, functions and talents to the association. It is or ought to 
be contrary to public policy to permit a spouse to exclude by contract his financial 
obligations, which ought to flow on termination of the marriage (whether by death 
or divorce) having regard to what is fair and equitable. The primary objective 
must be to do justice between the spouses ... " (my italics) 135 
133 Section 9 of the Constitution op cit. 
134 Section 172 of the Constitution op cit. 
135 Costa, "A Plea for the Reform of S7(3) of the Divorce Act op cit p921. 
